This Article seeks to expose two myths that have come to dominate the capital punishment discourse: first, that requiring physician participation would grind the administration of the death penalty to a halt; and second, that advocacy for such a requirement is a disingenuous abolitionist strategy as opposed to a principled remedial argument. As the Article demonstrates through a review of available research and recent litigation, doctors can, are willing to, and in fact do regularly participate in executions. States, however, have strategically emphasized the positions of national medical associations (the ethical guidelines of which are not binding on doctors) and exaggerated their inability to find willing doctors. They have also exploited the activism of the death penalty abolitionist movement, which has long decried physician participation in executions. Lawyers for death row inmates – many of whom consider themselves abolitionists – have argued in litigation that skilled anesthetic monitoring by trained medical professionals is a necessary component of a constitutional three-drug lethal injection protocol. Abolitionist calls for discipline of medical professionals who participate in such executions directly undermine the credibility of this position, and feed the perception that death penalty lawyers are talking out of both sides of their mouths.

Lower courts now grappling with how to implement Baze should know the truth about physician participation. The requirement that trained medical personnel monitor lethal injection executions to ensure that inmates do not suffer excruciating pain should remain on the table as a plausible remedy. Courts should recognize the discussion in Baze on this issue for what it is: dicta, unaided by the record, and based on unfounded assumptions.

This Comment explores the legal battle that might ensue between the NFL and its players if the current agreement expires.  Specifically, this Comment frames a hypothetical antitrust lawsuit that the players might file against the League and tests the extent to which the McNeil decision remains a valuable legal weapon for NFL players.  Before the players can subject the League to antitrust scrutiny under such a lawsuit, they must overcome the nonstatutory labor exemption to antitrust liability.  This Comment shows that the players can overcome this exemption and outlines the steps they must take to do so.  Taking into account the legal burden on the players as plaintiffs in the hypothetical lawsuit and the defenses available to the League, this Comment reveals that the NFL’s current labor system — salary cap, free agency system, entering player pool, and college draft — would likely violate antitrust laws under the McNeil framework.  Ultimately, the players’ AK-47 still has firepower.

This Comment rejects the notion that a comprehensive federal standard is the best way to protect the interests served by data breach notification laws.  More than simply combating identity theft and economic harm to individuals, many state data breach notification laws serve to protect more varied interests, attempting to strike a balance between the conflicting effects on consumers and businesses. Data breach notification laws are still in their infancy, and the distinctions state have draw should be preserved. Rather than subjecting businesses to federal blanket disclosure requirements, allowing the market to correct the data breach problem state-by-state is the best way to ensure that the level of rigor is properly calibrated. Even assuming a federal law could capture the “best practices” proven through various state experiments, a uniform standard strips this defining power from states to set the bar at the level each finds fitting. State statutes—combined with subject area-specific federal regulations—are more discerning tools for data security policy than a blunt federal standard.